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REVIEW 
 
Of  Menno T. Kamminga and Martin Scheinin, The Impact of Human Rights Law on 
General International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
 
 
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
 
By AXELLE REITER* 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
The book under review is the result of the work of the Committee on International 
Human Rights Law and Practice of the International Law Association on the impact of 
international human rights law on general international law, during the four years 
separating the 2004 Conference in Berlin, which entrusted the Committee with the task 
of preparing a report on the question, and the 2008 Conference in Rio de Janeiro, where 
its final report was adopted.1 It takes roots in the debate between tenants of the 
‘fragmentation’ or ‘unity’ of the international legal order and sides squarely with the 
latter by endorsing what it calls the ‘reconciliation’ view of the question. It recognises 
that the bearing of human rights on general international law is a two-way process. Yet, 
it focuses specifically on the influence that the norms instituting individual rights and 
obligations entrenched in international human rights law, international humanitarian 
law and international criminal law have on general public international law, as it is less 
documented than the more traditional contrary approach. In the process, it attempts to 
uncover the structural and substantive effects of the growing role that individuals and 
other non-state actors play on the international scene.  
2. Composition 
 
The final report of the Committee was drafted on the basis of the various papers 
collected in the edited book under review and comments from other members of the 
Committee. Accordingly, the first chapter of the book includes a general introduction 
and background information to the report before presenting its main findings regarding 
the different aspects of general international law that it deems particularly affected by 
the human rights paradigm. The topics covered range from the structure of 
international obligations to an analysis of the traditional sources of international law -
namely, international customs and treaties-, and from the relationship between 
international and domestic law and classical state prerogatives -like immunity, 
diplomatic protection and consular notification- to their responsibility for 
                                               
* Ph.D., European University Institute, Florence. 
1 International Law Association, Report of the 73th Conference (Rio de Janeiro, 2008). 
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internationally wrongful acts. The following contributions deal in a more detailed 
fashion with each of these matters in turn.  
2.1 Structure and sources of international obligations 
 
After the general introduction of its mandate, the report delves first into the question of 
the evolution of the structure of international obligations. In this regard, it concentrates 
on the development of two crucial notions; obligations erga omnes and peremptory or ius 
cogens norms. On one hand, obligations erga omnes are closely tied to the recognition by 
the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission of the 
emergence of an international community imbued with values and interests distinct 
from those of its member states. On the other hand, the International Law Commission 
relies on the concept of ius cogens in order to trump state consent and establish a 
normative hierarchy in the international legal order. According to the report, the 
practical effects of both notions remain scant and cannot be attributed to the influence of 
international human rights law, even if it constitutes its material core. 
 
Then, the report moves to the recent break in the formation of customary international 
law away from the theory of the two elements. It highlights the progressive reliance on 
deduction from fundamental principles in lieu and place of induction from state practice, 
as well as the emphasis on states declarations and professed intentions or the 
pronouncements of international bodies rather than their actual deeds. Although the 
International Court of Justice actually initiated this revolution, the preponderant role of 
human rights supervisory organs and international criminal tribunals into the 
redefinition of the concept cannot be neglected. As a result, the new approach has not 
infiltrated all areas of international law to the same extent and mostly rules over those 
associated with community interests.  
 
Next, the report tackles three issues related to the law of treaties; namely, treaty 
interpretation, reservations and state succession. It underlines the general inadequacy of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to deal with multilateral 
agreements, chiefly those assorted of specific monitoring mechanisms. Firstly, human 
rights bodies tend to assert an ‘exceptionalist’ position in relation to treaty 
interpretation; which is not expressly foreseen in general international law. Then again, 
they have effectively applied methods listed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. In 
consequence, they have not shaped the field in any significant manner.  
 
Secondly, international human rights law relies on the object and purpose test 
enshrined in the Vienna Convention to determine the permissibility of reservations. By 
opposition, it takes exception with the determination of their validity by states 
objections; a system which provides adequate guarantees for reciprocal engagements 
but cannot safeguard integral obligations. Instead, it entrusts supervisory organs with 
this task. The endorsement of this practice by the International Law Commission 
special rapporteur on reservations considerably affects the relevant international 
regime. Likewise, international human rights law departs from the usual regime 
governing the consequences of incompatible reservations by severing them from the 
bulk of the treaty. Subsequently, the instrument remains fully operative for the 
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reserving party without the benefit of the contentious reservation. However, several 
states expressly opposed this trend and the International Law Commission has not 
pronounced itself on the matter yet; leaving the question somewhat unresolved.  
 
Thirdly, the ‘clean slate’ doctrine applicable for state succession in respect of treaties, 
with the exception of boundaries and other territorial regimes, has been challenged by 
human rights organs. In contrast, they suggest that the specificity of human rights 
instruments mandates that their protection is left unaffected by state succession and 
transferred with the territory. Here again, their views have not been formally endorsed 
in general international law. Hence, the actual outcome produced on the field appears 
uncertain.  
2.2 State sovereignty and responsibility 
 
Traditionally, state sovereignty confers them several specific prerogatives and strongly 
weights over the interplay between international obligations and domestic law. 
Recently, international human rights law has mounted a systematic attack against each 
and every aspect  of this principle, culminating in the idea of crimes of states. In general 
international law, states can choose the means by which they implement international 
norms domestically, provided that they comply with the duties they have undertaken. 
Conversely, the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights have assumed 
in several instances that their rulings have direct effect upon the national legal order 
and ordered the adoption of very precise measures; with variable results at the domestic 
level, depending on the countries involved. The sovereign immunity of states and 
foreign officials in front of municipal courts and tribunals has been similarly assailed 
from a human rights perspective; yet, without much success. This being said, the 
ongoing debate and some contrary decisions and dissenting opinions foretell that the 
overall balance might lean in the opposite direction in the future. Besides, human rights 
law has only impacted marginally, if at all, on the development of general international 
norms regarding diplomatic protection, the right to consular notification and the 
attribution of state responsibility.  
 
By opposition, the notion of positive obligations developed in international human 
rights and humanitarian law has strongly permeated the case law of the International 
Court of Justice concerning such questions. In addition, the concept has been recognised 
in secondary rules of general international law, like the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in relation to the 
violation of ius cogens obligations. Finally, the United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council have recently recognised a duty for states to protect individuals 
against international crimes, whereas the International Law Commission’s Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts obliges them to use available 
lawful means to end serious breaches of peremptory norms. While the term ‘state 
crimes’ introduced in a previous draft of the Articles has been eliminated from the final 
document, this entails that some international offences generate graver consequences. 
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2.3 Findings 
 
The conclusions of the report are introduced by a caveat on the ongoing process of 
evolution undertaken by general international law. The following observations concede 
the somewhat mixed outcome of the enterprise in seven distinct points.  
 
First, the report identifies the causes of the partial alteration of the status quo with the 
necessity to account for the growing importance of non-state actors and the relevance of 
the international community as a whole. Second, it observes that the transforming 
impact of human rights is actually not so much the product of specific legal rules than of 
the endorsement of a human rights approach by the International Court of justice and 
the International Law Commission. Third, both organs have showed a marked 
reluctance to vindicate individual rights in cases of clashes with traditional state 
interests or prerogatives, leading to a rather patchy reception of the integration process. 
Fourth, the International Court of Justice, above all, merely acknowledges the 
emergence of concepts correlated to human rights without giving them a non-
perfunctory role, in an attempt to circumvent hostile responses. Fifth, the International 
Law Commission has likewise adopted a rather modest stance to the question. Sixth, the 
influence of human rights in general international law should be divorced from the 
broader debate on the unity or fragmentation of the international legal order. In 
particular, the International Law Commission tends to ground the unity of international 
law in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a multilateral agreement that is 
not particularly ‘friendly’ towards human rights concerns. The authors of the present 
report suggest that, on the contrary, human rights might ultimately constitute the core 
component of a unified international legal order and the main guarantor of the system’s 
internal coherence. Seventh, the silent legal revolution resulting from the increasing 
impact of human rights on general international law effectively challenges the 
paradigmatic statism of the regime. 
3. Contributions 
 
The article by Scheinin contrasts five readings of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. First, under the textual positivist approach, the terms of the Vienna 
Convention would only apply to interactions between states parties and only in relation 
to the agreements signed after the entry into force of the Vienna Convention. Secondly, 
this non-retroactivity clause makes exception for the provisions that belong to general 
international law. In consequence, under the dogmatic approach, the Vienna Convention 
is considered as a codification of international customs by the International Law 
Commission, whose rules apply to all multilateral treaties, independent of its 
ratification. However, this leads to a dogmatic interpretation of the dispositions of the 
Vienna Convention and poses problems in cases of lacunae.  
 
Thirdly, some assumptions in the Vienna Convention, like its focus on states interests 
and the delegation of the monitoring of treaty obligations to states rather than 
international supervisory bodies, fail to account for the non-reciprocal nature of law-
making conventions; chiefly, including human rights treaties. A first way out of this 
conundrum consists in emphasising the sui generis character of such treaties, even if this 
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results in a fragmentation of the international legal order. Fourthly, instead of 
identifying human rights treaties with a special regime, they can be granted a 
constitutional status. Accordingly, they would constitute an embryonic global 
constitution of a substantive type. Building upon the notion of ius cogens in the Vienna 
Convention, it entails a more coherent and unified vision of the international legal 
system and allows sidestepping its erosion through fragmentation.  
 
Fifthly, a last approach aims at reconciling the Vienna Convention with human rights 
treaties. It sees the Vienna Convention as a reflection of customary norms, an 
approximation of international customs that is subject to modification whenever the 
specificities of a treaty mandate it. Besides, some rules of the Vienna Convention allow 
for such exceptions. Scheinin favours the last two approaches and recommends using 
them complementarily, depending on the feasibility of the latter in the circumstances of 
the case in hand. 
 
According to Christoffersen’s contribution to the general principles of treaty 
interpretation, while it is generally assumed that the interpretation of human rights 
treaties is governed by specific rules, human rights supervisory bodies actually rely on 
accepted methods of interpretation. Focusing on the relevant case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the author puts forward that human rights law has not 
impacted substantially on general international law at the methodological level. 
 
Following Boerefijn, the approach adopted by the United Nations treaty-bodies and the 
European Court of Human Rights has impacted on the ongoing work of the 
International Law Commission on treaty reservations, even if the International Law 
Commission seems most concerned with the interests of states parties than with those 
of the individual beneficiaries of the protected rights. This position of the International 
Law Commission clashes with its recognition of the non-reciprocal character of human 
rights conventions. In addition, the International Law Commission uses other avenues 
than the human rights supervisory bodies to invalidate reservations and mostly rely on 
the general rules of public international law rather than on the (in-)compatibility with 
the specific object and purpose of human  rights instruments. As a result, it is difficult to 
determine the precise impact of human rights law on general international law 
regarding reservations, aside from the monitoring role of human rights supervisory 
bodies. 
 
Kamminga explores the impact of human rights on state succession in respect of 
treaties. In contrast with the traditionally accepted clean slate doctrine, successor states 
are bound to respect the individual rights previously guaranteed under human rights 
treaties. Hence, the continuous applicability of rights devolves with the territory, even 
though confirmation by the succeeding state helps avoiding ambiguities. This 
constitutes a major exception to general international law rules on state succession, 
solely comparable to the exception concerning treaties establishing boundaries and 
other territorial regimes. It also implies that successor states cannot enter new 
reservations to human rights treaties. 
 
Ryngaert and Wouters analyse the process of formation of customary international law. 
In matters related to community interests, the International Court of Justice has put 
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more emphasis on opinio iuris than actual state practice, at times even glossing over 
inconsistent practice; thereby, paving the way for an evolution of the customary 
formation process in the fields of international human rights and humanitarian law. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia goes one step further down 
that road and considers that battlefield practice is methodologically irrelevant because 
inherently untrustworthy. Likewise, the study on customary international humanitarian 
law by the International Committee of the Red Cross attaches more importance to 
verbal acts and opinio iuris, as well as to its own official statements, than to actual 
operational practice.  
 
On one hand, this ‘modernist positivist’ approach is informed by ideological 
considerations and value preferences, like any alternative methodology. In addition, the 
ensiung move towards iusnaturalism undermines legal certainty. On the other hand, the 
classical positivist approach is grounded in a similarly biaised vision and faces 
difficulties in accounting for the legal recognition of human rights. Incidentally, several 
sources of international law are divorced from state practice; chiefly, ius cogens norms 
and general principles of either international law or domestic constitutional law. 
Finally, emphasis on opinio iuris and states verbal commitments might entail a stronger 
attachment to consensualism than reference to inconsistent state practice. 
 
The current tendency to focus on multilateralism and obligations towards the 
international community as a whole, in lieu et place of bilateralism and reciprocal 
obligations, involve relying on deduction and selective practice in order to bring forth 
moral conclusions, instead of inductively deriving customary rules from actual state 
actions. As a result of the intensification of the former process, the ‘modernist positivist’ 
conception will increasingly permeate other areas of international law; hence, largely 
impacting on the development of general international law. 
 
The contribution of Sivakumaran on the structure of international obligations concludes 
that human rights norms have been central to the move away from bilateralism to 
community interests and the creation of a hierarchy  of norms at the international level, 
respectively through the notions of obligations erga omnes and ius cogens. This shift 
totally restructures general international obligations. More specifically, it leads to such 
fundamental corolaries as the invalidity of inconsistent treaty provisions, or Security 
Council resolutions, and to specific consequences at the level of state responsibility. 
 
Following Rensmann, whereas human rights breaches have not yet been entrenched as 
a general exception to the traditional immunity of states and their officials, international 
human rights law has contributed to the evolution from an absolute understanding to 
the current restrictive conception of immunity. In addition, contemporary attempts to 
further erode the traditional rules impact on the development of general international 
law in this direction. 
 
The articles by Cerna and Pisillo Mazzeschi both deal with diplomatic protection and, 
more precisely, with the right to consular notification. The traditional conception that 
the law on diplomatic protection  and the treatment of aliens only concerns interstate 
relations has been under attack from three fronts, by the widening of the scope and 
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public nature of international law, as well as of the holders and addressees of 
international rights and obligations.  
 
In this respect, the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights consider 
the right to notification of the right to consular assistance an integral part of the 
minimum due process guaranties required for a fair trial and, in capital cases, of the 
right to life of foreign detainees. In the process, they create a new human right to 
consular notification. The International Court of Justice has adopted a more cautious 
attitude and has condemned offenders for violating the rights of the national states 
rather than those of individual foreign prisoners. On the other hand, the International 
Court of Justice and the International Law Commission seem to include human rights in 
the material scope of the law on diplomatic protection.  
 
Accordingly, international norms on the treatment of aliens attribute rights 
simultaneously to individuals and national states. As a result, they regulate trilateral 
rather than bilateral relations; which constitutes an important change in the perception 
of these legal rules. Even if states are not obliged to protect their nationals abroad, the 
conception of diplomatic protection as a means to forward the respect of individual 
rights constitutes a decisive contribution to the evolution of general international law. 
Besides, the process is progressively developing and the Court of First instance of the 
European Communities has already consecrated the duty for member states to intervene 
in order to protect the rights of their citizens deprived of judicial remedies abroad. 
 
In his study on state responsibility, McCorquodale suggests that the International Law 
Commission treats human rights as a special regime inside the frame of general 
international law. States are held responsible for the acts and omissions of their organs 
and officials. In addition, the actions of private persons and entities are attributed to 
states whenever governments endorse them or their exercise basically amounts to 
public functions. In this respect, human rights supervisory bodies have confirmed and 
reinforced the general principles of state responsibility. The International Court of 
Justice has expressly rejected the lowering by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia of the effective control threshold required for the purposes of 
attribution under general international law, although it acknowledges the possibility of 
a lower test of control under international human rights law. Still, the impact of human 
rights on general international law concerning the issue of attribution remains minimal. 
In contrast, in relation to the international obligations of states, the International Court 
of Justice and the International Law Commission have recognised the development of 
positive obligations in the human rights case law, both territorially and extra-
territorially; considerably affecting the nature and extent of states’ obligations under 
general international law. Likewise, states’ obligations towards individuals have been 
extended to cover all persons under their jurisdiction, independently of their nationality. 
4. Assessment and conclusions 
 
The actual challenge faced by the Committee on International Human Rights Law and 
Practice of the International Law Association in defining the actual impact of human 
rights norms on the development of general international law cannot be overestimated. 
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The report explores nearly all aspects of general international law and tackles many, as 
yet, unresolved debates and controversies. Besides, the International Law Commission 
is still involved in the codification of several of the questions it investigates. As such, its 
task might justly appear Promethean, explaining some of the unavoidable shortcomings 
of the end product. In this view, the book under review provides a badly needed 
systematic general introduction to the many issues lying at the intersection between the 
two ensembles of norms. It usefully summarises and confronts the contrasted positions 
espoused by the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission, 
on one hand, and human rights supervisory bodies and international criminal tribunals, 
on the other hand. 
 
Unfortunately, the actual output of the report and the book under review does not fully 
meet the high standards set by its ambitions. While the seven points elaborated upon in 
the report’s findings and relevant caveat encapsulate the essence of the phenomenon and 
provide an interesting explanation for the contemporary evolution of the international 
legal order, the more specific conclusions adopted in relation to the various topics of 
international law under examination are often too modest; falling short of accounting 
for the actual impact of human rights sensu largo and community interests on general 
international law. There are at times discrepancies between the report’s findings and the 
contributions that it is meant to distill and, albeit to a lesser extent, between 
overlapping contributions on similar subject matters. In addition, in spite of 
introductory claims to the contrary, the position it occupies in the discussion on the 
‘fragmentation’ or ‘unity’ of the international legal order is far from obvious either. As a 
result, the general clarifying aim is all but attained. Moreover, the depth of the analysis 
and the significance of the ensuing findings vary widely from one contribution to the 
next. Also, they follow different approaches and methodologies; which further impedes 
an overall view of the question.  
 
The divergence of views is especially noticeable in relation to the structure of 
international obligations, the process of formation of customary international law, the 
immunity of states and their officials, the law of diplomatic protection and the right to 
consular notification; where the individual underlying contributions go much farther in 
acknowledging a dominant role of human rights than the final report does. 
Subsequently, the report underestimates the function of obligations erga omnes and ius 
cogens as a unifying factor behind the evolution of the international system from 
bilateralism to multilateralism; which constitutes the main impact of human rights 
norms on general international law.2 In contrast to the findings of the underlying paper 
and the views of the broader doctrine, it similarly minimises the effective revolution in 
the process of formation of customary international law. In this regard, the extent of the 
departure from the traditional theory of the two elements has led some authors to 
wonder whether one could speak of a new source of international law grounded in the 
preponderant role of the international judge in the definition of the substance of 
                                               
2 See: P-M Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, Cours général de droit international public’, 
(2002) 297 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye 9;  P-M Dupuy, ‘The 
Unity of Application of International Law at the Global Level and the Responsibility of Judges’ (2007) 
European Journal of Legal Studies 1; B Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in 
International Law’, (1994) 250 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye 217. 
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customs, on the basis of normative rather than strictly positivist premises.3 Likewise, the 
report considerably plays down the progressive and ongoing erosion of the traditional 
prerogatives of state sovereignty. 
 
Finally, the approach adopted by some of the underlying contributions also raises 
questions. In particular, the want of a systematic and thorough analysis of the position 
of international organs on the interpretation of treaties is striking. On one hand, 
Scheinin’s exposition of the five possible readings of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties has the merit to present a critical overview of the doctrinal debates. Yet, he 
mostly grounds his vision of the Convention on purely normative considerations and 
does not delve in any details into the positions of international organs on the question. 
On the other hand, Christoffersen’ article on the general principles of treaty 
interpretation limits itself to a study of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights and does not look at the methods used by other human rights supervisory bodies 
and international criminal tribunals, both of which are usually considered to rely on 
more proactive interpretative techniques. As a result, the conclusions drawn in this 
respect are necessarily incomplete.  
 
At another level, the contribution by Ryngaert and Wouters on the process of 
transformation of customary international law departs from the classical positivist 
position that would be expected from a paper meant to describe the current state of the 
field. Unlike the final report, it recognises the amplitude of the ongoing shift towards 
natural law. However, the authors avowedly endorse the iusnaturalist turn towards 
what they somewhat ambiguously call the ‘modernist positivist’ approach, on account of 
the necessity to better protect and promote human rights, though at the cost of 
doctrinal rigor and legal certainty. Nonetheless, this move does not only entail innocent 
consequences in the framework of criminal trials, in which it was precisely developed. 
One cannot fail to notice the advantages of this type of casual approach to the 
identification of customary norms in the context of classical human rights litigation. By 
opposition, overtly progressive methods of interpretation produce truly problematical 
results when adopted in the frame of trials involving the determination of individual 
criminal responsibility for grave breaches of international law, likely to be sanctioned by 
extremely heavy sentences. In effect, so-called ‘modernist positivism’ actually clashes 
with the human rights paradigm instead of enhancing it:4 it undermines the prohibition 
                                               
3 See: N Arajärvi, ‘The Role of the International Criminal Judge in the Formation of Customary 
International Law’, (2007) European Journal of Legal Studies 1, 30; I Bantekas, ‘Reflections on Some 
Sources and Methods of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law’, (2006)International Criminal 
Law Review 129-132. 
4 See, in this regard, for a critical assessment of the new method of customs’ formation, in particular, and 
the authoritarian conception of justice that underlies such teleological approaches to criminal law, more 
generally: A. Fichtelberg, ‘Liberal Values in International Criminal Law’, (2008) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 18-9; A Guellali, Droit international pénal, droit humanitaire et droits de l’homme (PhD 
Thesis, Florence, European University Institute, 2008) 362-364; T Hoffmann, ‘The Gentle Humanizer of 
Humanitarian Law’, in C Stahn and L Van Den Herik, Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice 
(Asser, The Hague 2010) 58-80; D Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, (2008) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 925-963; D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International 
Criminal Law’, in C Stahn and L Van Den Herik, Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice 
(Asser, The Hague 2010) 115-160; G Sluiter and A Zahar, International Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) 97, 105; J Verhoeven, ‘Article 21 of the Rome Statue and the Ambiguities of 
Applicable Law’, (2002) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 22. 
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of retroactive offences, a fundamental right that cannot be derogated from even in times 
of war or public emergency, and impedes the development of the rule of law at the 
global level, by effectively canceling out the principle of legality. 
 
To sum up, the book under review constitutes an interesting contribution to the 
analysis of the metamorphosis currently undergone by international law, from a 
fragmented set of bilateral and reciprocal primary obligations into a fully integrated 
legal order, based on a hierarchy of norms grounded in the interests of the international 
community as a whole. Besides, it correctly identifies this transformation with the 
process of substantive unification of international law. However, it does not always 
recognise the logical conclusions that obtain from these bold premises and often 
underplays actual developments that are already observable in the practice of 
international organs; ultimately leaving the reader with an impression of ‘much ado 
about nothing’.  
 
 
